This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational in ‡ation expectations in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The representative agent is assumed to behave as an econometrician, employing a time series model for in ‡ation that allows for both permanent and temporary shocks. The near-unity coe¢ cient on expected in ‡ation in the Phillips curve causes the agent's perception of a unit root in in ‡ation to become close to self-ful…lling. In a "consistent expectations equilibrium,"the value of the Kalman gain parameter in the agent's forecast rule is pinned down using the observed autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes. The forecast errors observed by the agent are close to white noise, making it di¢ cult for the agent to detect a misspeci…cation of the forecast rule. I show that this simple model of in ‡ation expectations can generate time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that observed in long-run U.S. data. Model-based values for expected in ‡ation track well with movements in survey-based measures of U.S. expected in ‡ation. In numerical simulations, the model can generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level of in ‡ation that are driven solely by expectational feedback, not by changes in monetary policy.
1 Introduction
Overview
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is derived most straightforwardly from Calvo's (1983) model of sticky price adjustment. Numerous researchers have criticized the fullyrational NKPC on grounds that a reasonably parameterized version fails to capture important features of post-World War II U.S. data, namely, high levels of in ‡ation persistence and the delayed and gradual response of in ‡ation to unanticipated monetary policy shocks. 1 Other researchers have argued that the appropriate inclusion of exogenous stochastic driving variables that re ‡ect changes in monetary policy can improve the empirical performance of the fullyrational NKPC. 2 This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational in ‡ation expectations in the NKPC for an economy where all monetary policy variables are held constant. The representative agent is assumed to behave as an econometrician, employing a time series model for in ‡ation that allows for both permanent and temporary shocks. The agent's perceived optimal forecast rule is de…ned by the Kalman …lter. I show that the perceived optimal value of the Kalman gain parameter assigned to the last observed in ‡ation rate is given by the …xed point of a nonlinear map that relates the gain parameter to the observed autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes. By computing the value of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient, the agent can identify the "signal-tonoise ratio,"which measures the relative variances of the perceived permanent and temporary shocks to in ‡ation. A higher signal-to-noise ratio calls for a higher Kalman gain parameter which, in turn, places more weight on recent in ‡ation data in the agent's forecast rule. In a "consistent expectations equilibrium," the forecast errors observed by the agent are close to white noise, making it di¢ cult for the agent to detect a misspeci…cation of the forecast rule. 3 Moreover, from the individual agent's perspective, switching to a fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast (which makes use of the output gap or real marginal cost) would appear to reduce forecast accuracy, so there is no incentive to switch. Intuitively, the equilibrium exploits the fact that expected in ‡ation enters the NKPC with a near-unity coe¢ cient. This feature causes the agent's perception of a unit root in in ‡ation to become close to self-ful…lling.
The model allows for either a constant gain or a variable gain, depending on the length of the sample period used by the agent to identify the signal-to-noise ratio from observed in ‡ation data. As the sample period becomes in…nitely long, the equilibrium yields a constant gain. A rolling sample period yields a variable gain. From the agent's perspective, the use of a variable Kalman gain is justi…ed by perceived movements in the signal-to-noise ratio.
In the variable-gain version of the model, the nonlinear law of motion for in ‡ation generates time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that observed in long-run U.S. data. The model's methodology for identifying the signal-to-noise ratio can be applied directly to U.S. in ‡ation data. The identi…ed U.S. signal-to-noise ratio exhibits an upward drift during the 1970s, followed by downward drift from the mid-1990s onwards. The downward drifting ratio over the last decade indicates a reduced likelihood of a permanent shift, either upwards or downwards, in the Fed's in ‡ation target. This evidence is consistent with the idea of "well-anchored in ‡ation expectations"in describing the recent environment (see, for example, Williams 2006 ). The identi…ed signal-to-noise ratio in U.S. data might therefore be viewed as an inverse measure of the Fed's credibility for maintaining a constant in ‡ation target. In the consistent expectations framework, the agent's in ‡ation forecast is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past observed in ‡ation rates. This feature tracks well with movements in survey-based measures of U.S. expected in ‡ation.
The driving variable for in ‡ation in the model can be interpreted as either the output gap or real marginal cost. Monetary policy enters the model implicitly through two channels: (i) the steady-state in ‡ation rate around which the NKPC is log-linearized-maintained here at zero, or (ii) the parameters that govern the exogenous stochastic process for the driving variable. All policy-dependent parameters are held constant throughout the analysis. Interestingly, the model can generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level of in ‡ation that are driven solely by expectational feedback, not by changes in monetary policy. The low-frequency swings derive from the near-random walk behavior of in ‡ation under consistent expectations. From the agent's perspective, the observed low-frequency swings justify the use of a forecast rule that allows for permanent shocks. This aspect of the model bears similarity to the "optimal misspeci…ed beliefs" concept described by Sargent (1999, Chapter 6) . Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) were among the …rst to call attention to the dramatic changes in in ‡ation persistence in long-run U.S. data. Barsky (p. 3) noted that "In ‡ation evolved from essentially a white noise process in the pre-World War I years, to a highly persistent, non-stationary ARIMA process in the post-1960 period." More recently, Sargent (2002, 2005) employ vector autoregressions that allow for drifting coe¢ cients and stochastic volatility to document the evolving nature of U.S. in ‡ation dynamics in postWorld War II data. Their methodology identi…es a positive correlation between measures of persistence, volatility, and the level of in ‡ation in post-World War II data. Simple 20-year rolling summary statistics con…rm these basic …ndings. As a caveat, it should be noted that …ndings of time-varying in ‡ation persistence in recent data are not universal. Pivetta and Reis (2007) argue that the wide con…dence intervals around measures of in ‡ation persistence do not allow one to reject the hypothesis of no change in persistence since 1965. These authors do …nd robust evidence of a change in in ‡ation volatility, however.
Shifts in monetary policy are one candidate for explaining changes in in ‡ation dynamics.
Both Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) attribute the change in in ‡ation persistence after World War I to the abandonment of the classical gold standard. A gold standard can be viewed as a price-level targeting regime. Under an in ‡ation-targeting regime, shifts in the central bank's in ‡ation target (which determines the trend in ‡ation rate) can distort standard measures of persistence and volatility. For this reason, measures of persistence and volatility should be conditioned on an estimate of trend in ‡ation. 4 In computing the 20-year rolling summary statistics, I control for shifts in trend in ‡ation by …rst extracting the low-frequency component of U.S. in ‡ation. Detrended in ‡ation continues to exhibit time-varying patterns of persistence and volatility, even during periods of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy, such as the sample period since 1995. Such observations suggest that U.S. in ‡ation is driven by a number of di¤erent nonlinearities, not just those attributable to policy regime shifts.
Related Literature
The consideration of boundedly-rational in ‡ation expectations is motivated by empirical evidence. Survey-based measures of U.S. in ‡ation expectations tend to systematically underpredict actual in ‡ation in the sample period prior to October 1979 and systematically overpredict it thereafter. Rational expectations would not give rise to a sustained sequence of one-sided forecast errors. Roberts (1997 ), Carroll (2003 , Wolfers (2004), and Branch (2004) all …nd evidence that survey-based measures of U.S. in ‡ation expectations do not make the most e¢ cient use of available information. The boundedly-rational form of expectations used here is similar to that explored by Evans and Ramey (2006) in the context of the Lucas (1973) monetary policy model. In their framework, the value of the gain parameter is pinned down using a Nash equilibrium concept. 5 An empirical study by Ball (2000) allows for a switch between two forms of "near-rational" forecast rules to help account for the dramatic change in U.S. in ‡ation persistence identi…ed by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) . In Ball's framework, the switch between forecast rules is imposed within the model; it is not an endogenous response to an actual or perceived shift in fundamentals. Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Milani (2005) introduce in ‡ation persistence in the form of constant-gain learning in models where the underlying fundamentals do not shift. The representative agent's perceived law of motion for in ‡ation is an AR(1) process with parameters that are perpetually re-estimated using recent data. Unlike here, the constant gain used in the learning algorithm is a free parameter that is calibrated rather than endogenized within the model itself. In the learning model of Erceg and Levin (2003) , the value of the gain parameter is estimated by minimizing the squared deviations between the model's in ‡ation expectations and survey-based U.S. in ‡ation expectations.
Research that examines the links between exogenous policy rule shifts and in ‡ation dynamics includes Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Roberts (2006) , and Cecchetti et al. (2007) . Papers by Tinsley (2002, 2005) , Ireland (2007) , and Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show that the empirical performance of the fully-rational NKPC can be improved by introducing a highly persistent, exogenous stochastic process for the central bank's in ‡ation target. It remains unclear, however, why an optimizing central bank would wish to adopt such a process for the in ‡ation target. 6 Moreover, in order to account for the time-varying dynamic properties of detrended U.S. in ‡ation, these models would need to incorporate exogenous shifts in other parameters of the central bank's policy rule. The approach taken here is to develop a model that abstracts from actual shifts in the central bank's in ‡ation target or any other aspect of monetary policy. The model simulations are compared to U.S. data on the basis of detrended in ‡ation behavior-analogous to the methodology employed in the real business cycle literature. The main message of the paper is that expectational feedback can be an important driving force for in ‡ation dynamics.
2 Time-Varying Persistence and Volatility in U.S. In ‡ation Figure 1 provides evidence of time-varying persistence and volatility in U.S. in ‡ation data. The left-side panels plot the data and 20-year rolling summary statistics for CPI in ‡ation from 1871.Q1 to 2004.Q4. The right-side panels plot the same information for GDP price in ‡ation from 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4. 7 The 20-year rolling summary statistics are computed for both the raw and detrended in ‡ation series. Detrending is a way to control for shifts in the central bank's in ‡ation target that may have occurred over time. 8 [ Figure 1 about here] Panel 1a illustrates the dramatic di¤erence in the behavior of pre-and post-World War I in ‡ation noted by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) . The simple measure of persistence used 6 In Ireland (2007) , the law of motion for the in ‡ation target is a geometric random walk. Exogenous shocks can permanently shift the target by amounts that are determined by exogenous monetary policy coe¢ cients. 7 The annualized 1-quarter in ‡ation rate is given by 4 log (Pt=Pt 1) ; where Pt is the relevant price index. The quarterly CPI data were constructed by averaging monthly CPI data obtained from Robert Shiller's website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.htm. Shiller's data employs the CPI-U (Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1913 onward. For prior years, Shiller's price index is constructed by splicing to monthly price data obtained from Warren and Pearson (1935, Table 1, pp. 11-14) . Data on the quarterly GDP price index is from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCTPI.
8 Throughout the paper, the in ‡ation trend is de…ned as the low-frequency component of the data ( ‡uctua-tions longer than 32 quarters) extracted using the band pass …lter approximation of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . Similar results are obtained if the data are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
here is the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient. 9 Persistence hovers close to zero during the pre-World War I era but then starts to increase around the year 1915 (panel 1c). There are some notable variations in persistence over the ensuing decades, followed by a sharp drop in the rolling autocorrelation towards the end of the sample. The end-of-sample drop in persistence is also evident in GDP price in ‡ation (panel 1d).
Volatility is measured by the 20-year rolling standard deviation. The volatility of CPI in ‡ation declines from the early part of the sample until about the year 1970. Volatility then traces out a hump-shaped pattern over the next 35 years (panel 1e). The volatility of GDP price in ‡ation exhibits a similar hump-shaped pattern (panel 1f).
Measures of persistence and volatility are generally lower in the detrended data, but the basic patterns resemble those in the raw data. Notice that these measures have declined during the sample period since 1995. During the post-World War II sample period, the most striking feature is the similarity in the patterns observed for the rolling persistence, rolling volatility, and rolling mean of U.S. in ‡ation. This result con…rms the …ndings of Sargent (2002, 2005) who use forward-looking Bayesian methods to identify a strong positive correlation among summary statistics computed for post-World War II in ‡ation data. Interestingly, one can identify some roughly similar patterns of comovement in the rolling summary statistics for the earlier in ‡ation data plotted on the left-side of Figure 1 . Overall, the time-varying features of the data suggest the presence of nonlinearities in the law of motion for U.S. in ‡ation. In later sections of the paper, a quantitative summary of U.S. in ‡ation dynamics will be compared with the results of model simulations.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The starting point for the analysis is the standard NKPC:
where t is the in ‡ation rate de…ned as the log di¤erence of the price level, is the representative agent's subjective time discount factor, y t is a stationary driving variable, and " t is an iid markup shock that is often motivated by the presence of a variable tax rate. 10 The symbol b E t represents the agent's subjective expectation conditioned on information available at time t. Under rational expectations, b E t corresponds to the mathematical expectation operator E t evaluated using the objective distributions of the driving variable and the markup shock.
The driving variable can be interpreted as either the output gap (often measured by detrended real GDP) or the representative …rm's real marginal cost (often measured by labor's 9 Another commonly-used measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients in a univariate regression. In the case of an AR(2) with coe¢ cients 1 and 2; we have Corr ( t; t 1) = 1= (1 2) : Both measures of persistence are increasing in 1 and 2:
1 0 The rational expectations version of equation (1) is derived by Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) .
share of income). Since y t is taken here to be exogenous, none of the paper's theoretical results depend on which interpretation is chosen. 11 The law of motion for the driving variable is
where u t is an iid demand shock that is uncorrelated with the markup shock.
Monetary policy enters implicitly in the model through two potential channels. The …rst is the steady-state in ‡ation rate that is used when deriving equation (1) using a log-linear approximation. The second is the values of and 2 u ; which can be interpreted as reducedform parameters that depend in a complicated way on the central bank's policy rule. 12 For both of the equilibrium concepts described below, the in ‡ation process remains stationary around the zero-in ‡ation steady state. The parameters and 2 u are held constant throughout the analysis.
Rational Expectations
Under rational expectations, the in ‡ation rate at time t is uniquely pinned down by the agent's forecast of discounted future values of the driving variable, plus the current realization of the markup shock. To derive the unique rational expectations solution, …rst replace b E t in equation (1) with E t : Equation (1) can then be iterated forward to substitute out t+1+k for k = 0; 1; 2; ::: Applying the law of iterated expectations and imposing a transversality condition yields the following present-value in ‡ation equation re t = E t y t + y t+1 + 2 y t+2 + :::
where re t represents the equilibrium in ‡ation rate under rational expectations. Given that u t is iid, equation (3) admits the following closed-form solution:
which shows that the rational (or fundamentals-based) in ‡ation rate inherits its stochastic properties from both the autoregressive driving variable and the white-noise markup shock.
1 1 In empirical applications, the choice of driving variable is quite important. Detrended real GDP is procyclical whereas labor's share of income is countercyclical. See Rudd and Whelan (2005b Equations (2) and (4) yield the following expressions for the unconditional moments:
Corr re t ;
where V ar ( ) denotes the unconditional variance, Corr ( ; ) is the unconditional correlation coe¢ cient, and re t = re t re t 1 : Equation (6) con…rms the results of Fuhrer (2006) that small values for the Phillips curve slope parameter combined with nontrivial values for the shock variance ratio 2 " = 2 u (the empirically plausible case) imply weak persistence of in ‡ation under rational expectations-a result that con ‡icts sharply with post-World War II U.S. in ‡ation data. Equation (7) predicts that the autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes is negative-a robust feature of U.S. data. Small values for the Phillips curve slope parameter imply 2 0; such that Corr From equation (4), the one-period-ahead rational forecast is given by
which shows that the fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast is perfectly correlated with movements in the driving variable. The forecast requires information about the current value of y t ; the policy-dependent parameter ; and the Phillips curve slope parameter : The discount factor is aspect of the agent's preferences and does not need to be observed.
Consistent Expectations
Equation (8) shows that rational forecasts derived from the standard NKPC are built on strong assumptions about the representative agent's information set. In actual forecasting applications, real-time di¢ culties in observing the driving variable, together with empirical instabilities in the parameters and ; could lead to large and persistent forecast errors. Numerous studies have demonstrated that forecasts of U.S. in ‡ation computed from empirical Phillips curve models can frequently underperform forecasts derived from simple univariate time series models, such as a random walk, AR, or ARMA. 13 One would expect to encounter similar forecasting di¢ culties using the standard NKPC. These ideas motivate consideration of a univariate forecasting algorithm-one that requires very little computational or informational resources. A long history in macroeconomics suggests the following error-correction approach:
where t b E t 1 t is the forecast error in period t: I assume that the agent's subjective forecast makes use of the contemporaneous realization t : This setup avoids the introduction of an extra lag of in ‡ation that might be viewed as arti…cially in ‡uencing the resulting dynamics. 14 Equation (9) implies that the agent's forecast at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past observed in ‡ation rates. By comparison, the "sticky-information" model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) implies that the agent's forecast at time t is based on an exponentiallyweighted moving average of past rational forecasts. 15 Both arrangements bear symmetry to the Calvo (1983) sticky-price model where the equilibrium price level at time t is an exponentiallyweighted moving average of past observed prices.
As originally shown by Muth (1960) , the subjective forecast rule (9) will coincide with rational expectations when the forecast variable follows a simple and intuitive law of motion. That form is adopted here as the representative agent's perceived law of motion:
where t is the unobservable in ‡ation trend, v t is a transitory shock that pushes t away from trend, and t is permanent shock (uncorrelated with v t ) that shifts the trend over time. The subjective forecast b E t t+1 is set equal to the Kalman …lter estimate of t : The random walk plus noise speci…cation in (10) is equivalent to an ARMA (1,1), as shown by Harvey (1993, p. 125) . From a behavioral perspective, the representative agent can be viewed as an econometrician, employing a time series model identical to that used recently by Stock and Watson (2007) . It need not be the case that the agent literally believes that in ‡ation is governed by a unit root process. Rather, the agent may simply consider (10) to be versatile and parsimonious time series model for the purpose of constructing a real-time in ‡ation forecast, say, because real-time data for the driving variable y t is subject to measurement error.
Some technical points are worth noting. First, although the perceived law of motion (10) allows for permanent shifts in the in ‡ation trend, the equilibrium in ‡ation process (to be de…ned below) remains stationary around the zero-in ‡ation steady state. For this reason, I 1 4 A lagged information assumption is often used in learning models to avoid simultaneity in the determination of the actual and expected values of the forecast variable. In the continuous time limit, the distinction between contemporaneous and lagged information disappears.
1 5 The sticky-information model is discussed further in Section 7.
abstract from changes in the functional form of the NKPC that arise when the Calvo pricing equation is log-linearized around a non-zero in ‡ation rate, as shown by Ascari (2004) and Sahuc (2006) . Second, I abstract from "long-horizon expectations" that arise in the NKPC when forward-looking agents employ subjective forecasts of future in ‡ation, as discussed by Preston (2005) . The perceived law of motion (10) implies b E t t+j = b E t t+1 for all future horizons j = 2; 3; 4::: Equation (1) can therefore be viewed as a log-linear approximation of a more-complicated NKPC that explicitly incorporates long-horizon in ‡ation expectations.
The agent's perceived optimal choice of in equation (9) is determined by the Kalman …lter, where the objective is to minimize the mean squared forecast error
2 . In steady-state, the unique solution for the perceived optimal gain parameter is
where = 2 = 2 v is the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. 16 As ! 1; the gain parameter approaches 1. From the agent's perspective, the shocks themselves v t and t are unobservable, but the shock variances 2 and 2 v can be inferred from the moments of in ‡ation changes t ; which are observable. Proposition 1. If the representative agent's perceived law of motion is given by equation (10), then the perceived optimal value of the Kalman gain parameter is uniquely pinned down by the autocorrelation of observed in ‡ation changes, Corr ( t ; t 1 ) :
Proof : From (10), we have t = t +v t v t 1 : Since t and v t are perceived to be independent, we have Cov ( t ; t 1 ) = 2 v and V ar ( t ) = 2 +2 2 v : Combining these two expressions and solving for the signal-to-noise ratio yields
The above expression shows that Corr ( t ; t 1 ) uniquely pins down which, in turn, uniquely pins down from equation (11).
Substituting the subjective forecast rule (9) into the NKPC equation (1) yields the following system of equations that de…ne the actual law of motion for in ‡ation: 
where appears in numerous coe¢ cients. The variance-covariance matrix V of the left-side variables in equation (12) can be computed using the formula:
where is the variance-covariance matrix of the fundamental shocks u t and " t . Since the matrix A contains only …ve non-zero elements, straightforward (but tedious) computations yield the following analytical expressions for the unconditional moments:
V ar
which are all nonlinear in the gain parameter . From equation (16), we see that in ‡ation persistence is always positive, but the precise magnitude depends on the value of and several other parameters in a rather complicated way. Equation (17) shows that the agent's in ‡ation forecast is positively correlated with the driving variable y t , similar to the case of rational expectations.
De…ning the Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
This section de…nes the concept of a "consistent expectations equilibrium" along the lines of Hommes and Sorger (1998) . By applying the results of Proposition 1, the value of the Kalman gain parameter can be pinned down using the unconditional moments of t : By construction of the equilibrium, the agent's forecast rule will be parameterized such that the perceived law of motion (PLM) and the actual law of motion (ALM) exhibit the same …rst-order autocorrelation for t : 17 The following expression for t can be derived from the actual law of motion:
where the constants a i and b i are used here to represent combinations of parameters. Equation (18) can be used to compute the following unconditional moments:
where V ar b E t t+1 is given by equation (14) and Cov b E t t+1 ; y t is given by equation (17). Dividing equation (20) by equation (19) yields an expression for Corr ( t ; t 1 ) which is nonlinear in the gain parameter : This nonlinear expression is employed in the following de…nition of equilibrium. De…nition 1. A consistent expectations equilibrium is de…ned as a perceived law of motion (10), an actual law of motion (12), and an associated Kalman gain parameter ; such that is the …xed point of the nonlinear map = T ( ) ; where
with V ar ( t ) and Cov ( t ; t 1 ) computed from the actual law of motion, as given by equations (19) and (20).
The equilibrium de…ned above is closely related to the concept of "optimal misspeci…ed beliefs" described by Sargent (1999, Chapter 6) . In Sargent's example, the gain parameter in the agent's adaptive forecast rule is chosen to minimize the one-step-ahead mean squared forecast error, given data generated by the actual law of motion. Here, the agent behaves similarly by choosing a Kalman gain that minimizes the mean squared forecast error for the perceived law of motion, given a signal-to-noise ratio that is inferred from data generated by the actual law of motion. In Sargent's example, the unit root in the agent's forecast rule compensates for an omitted constant. Here, the unit root in the agent's forecast rule compensates for the omitted driving variable y t . In both cases, the agent's misspeci…ed forecast rule alters the dynamics of the model in a way that tends to con…rm the agent's belief in a unit root.
A more-complicated version of the model would allow the agent's subject forecast b E t y t+1 to appear on the right side of equation (2), as in a micro-founded IS equation. If the agent's perceived law of motion for y t presumed the existence of a unit root, analogous to the form of (10), then the actual law of motion for y t would likely be very persistent but stationary, as assumed here. The Kalman gain parameters for the two subjective forecast rules b E t y t+1 and b E t t+1 would then need to be determined simultaneously in equilibrium, possibly giving rise to multiple consistent expectations equilibria.
Numerical Solution for the Equilibrium
The complexity of the nonlinear map = T ( ) necessitates a numerical solution for the equilibrium. To accomplish this, the model is calibrated using a set of parameter values that are either estimated directly or based on empirical estimates reported in the literature. I choose = 0:90 and u = 0:01 based on regressions using either the output gap (the deviation of log real GDP from log potential output) or labor's share of income (as a measure real marginal cost) over the period 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4. 18 Estimates of the NKPC parameters ; ; and " are sensitive to the choice of the driving variable, the speci…cation for in ‡ation expectations, the sample period, and the econometric method. 19 Based on the various studies, I choose = 0:98; = 0:03; and " = 0:01 as baseline values. I also examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative parameter values.
Figure 2 plots T ( ) over the range 0 < 1 for two di¤erent values of : Other parameter con…gurations produced similarly-shaped T ( ) maps. At the baseline calibration with = 0:03, the unique …xed point occurs at = 0:346; which corresponds to Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = 0:458: When = 0:08; the unique …xed point occurs at = 0:695; which corresponds to Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = 0:279: Plausible values for the quarterly discount factor imply a near-unity coe¢ cient on b E t t+1 in the NKPC equation (1). This feature of the model causes the agent's perception of a unit root in in ‡ation to become close to self-ful…lling for most values of . As a result, the plot of T ( ) lies very close to the 45-degree line for most values of . Similar results would likely obtain for any in ‡ation equation that places a sizeable weight on expected in ‡ation. The plot of T ( ) suggests that in ‡ation forecast accuracy is not likely to su¤er much as long as remains in the general vicinity of : This conjecture turns out to be true, as discussed later in section 6.
[ Figure 2 about here] Table 1 shows the theoretical moments of t predicted by the perceived law of motion (10) and the actual law of motion (12). By construction of the equilibrium, the standard deviation and the …rst-order autocorrelation are identical for the two laws of motion. The higher-order autocorrelations agree to the third decimal place, giving no obvious indication to the agent that the perceived law of motion is misspeci…ed. " : Roughly speaking, parameter changes that increase the persistence of actual in ‡ation have the e¤ect of increasing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio and hence : Parameter changes that decrease the persistence of actual in ‡ation have the e¤ect of decreasing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. The intuition for the e¤ects of parameter changes is straightforward. From the agent's perspective, in ‡ation is comprised of a persistent signal component t and a transitory noise component v t : If a parameter shift causes observed in ‡a-tion to become more persistent, then the agent's inferred value of the signal-to-noise ratio will increase. Table 2 also reports the numerically-computed slope of the nonlinear map at the equilibrium point, i.e., T 0 ( ). The slope is only slightly below unity for most parameterizations of the model, again re ‡ecting the fact that the map runs very close to the 45-degree line in the vicinity of :
At the baseline calibration (top left of Table 2 ), we have Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = 0:90 versus Corr re t ; re t 1 = 0:23: Under rational expectations, the autocorrelation coe¢ cient shrinks rapidly as: (1) the fundamental shock ratio 2 " = 2 u increases, (2) the discount factor decreases, or (3) the driving variable persistence decreases. Under consistent expectations, the autocorrelation coe¢ cient is much less sensitive to changes in these parameter values. Table 2 , we have 0:19 0:70: Panel 3a shows that in ‡ation persistence is generally high, but drops o¤ dramatically for > 0:9 or < 0:1. Panel 3b shows that in ‡ation volatility increases with in a nonlinear fashion and always exceeds the corresponding value under rational expectations. The fact that in ‡ation persistence and volatility can vary, depending on the value of ; is an important feature that will be examined later in a "variable-gain" version of the model.
[ Figure 3 about here].
Real-Time Learning
This section investigates the convergence properties of the consistent expectations equilibrium under real-time learning. Recall that the …xed point of the nonlinear map = T ( ) is computed using the population autocorrelation Corr ( t ; t 1 ) : This statistic presumes a …xed Kalman gain. However, in a real-time learning environment where the Kalman gain evolves over time, the agent will only have knowledge of the sample autocorrelation which, in turn, is in ‡uenced by the trajectory of the Kalman gain. The learning algorithm is described by a system of nonlinear stochastic di¤erence equations summarized in Appendix A.
For each 200,000 period simulation, I set t = = 0:346 for the …rst 500 periods. t 1 ) = 0:458: The sensitivity of the Kalman gain to the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient is a feature of the nonlinear learning dynamics. This feature is incorporated into a "variable-gain"version of the model, to be discussed in Section 8.
[ Figure 4 about here].
Applying the Model' s Methodology to U.S. In ‡ation Data
Figure 5 provides a check on the reasonableness of the equilibrium values of and implied by the model. Panel 4a plots the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the change in U.S. GDP price in ‡ation. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient is negative throughout the sample. Panel 4b plots the perceived signal-to-noise ratio computed directly from the autocorrelation coe¢ cient using the formula in Proposition 1. The perceived signal-to-noise ratio ‡uctuates from a low of 0.1 to a high of 5.7. The upward spike that occurs in the early-1990s is due to the autocorrelation coe¢ cient becoming less negative at that time. The perceived ratio drifts upward in the 1970s, remains high for about two decades, and then drifts downward from the mid-1990s onwards. Stock and Watson (2007) obtain similar results when estimating an unobserved-components model identical to (10) using data on U.S. GDP price in ‡ation from 1953.Q1 to 2004.Q4. Assuming that the shock variances follow independent geometric random walks, Stock and Watson (2007) identify a statistically signi…cant hump-shaped pattern for the variance of the permanent shock, but cannot reject the hypothesis of no change in the variance of the transitory shock. Piger and Rasche (2006) report a decline in the estimated variance of permanent shocks to U.S. in ‡ation in the sample period after 1994.Q1. They interpret their results as "evidence that long-horizon in ‡ation expectations have become better anchored" during this period. The foregoing results suggest that the signal-to-noise ratio identi…ed from the data might be viewed as an inverse measure of the Fed's credibility for maintaining a constant in ‡ation target.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Roberts (2006) presents evidence that the slope parameter in reduced-form Phillips curve regressions has become smaller in recent decades. The consistent expectations model predicts that a decline in the Phillips curve slope parameter will make actual in ‡ation less persistent and therefore be accompanied by a decline in the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. The post-1990 downward drift in the identi…ed U.S. signal-to-noise ratio shown in panel 4b could thus be partially attributable to a decline in the Phillips curve slope parameter.
Panel 4c plots the Kalman gain computed directly from the perceived signal-to-noise ratio using equation (11). The rolling sample period allows the Kalman gain to adjust to perceived shifts in the signal-to-noise ratio. The Kalman gain ‡uctuates from a low of 0.28 to a high of 0.87, with the high also occurring in the early 1990s. Section 8 presents a "variable-gain" version of the model where is pinned down using a rolling autocorrelation for t . Figure 6 compares U.S. expected in ‡ation to the corresponding model-based values. Expected in ‡ation in U.S. data is measured by the 1-year ahead forecast for GDP price in ‡ation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Comparisons with other surveys yielded similar results. The sample period for the survey starts in 1970.Q1. 20 For the rational expectations (RE) version of the model, expected in ‡ation is computed from equation (8) using the baseline parameter values. The driving variable is either the output gap or labor's share of income from U.S. data. 21 For the consistent expectations (CE) version of the model, expected in ‡a-tion is computed from equation (9) with = 0:346; where t is given by the realized value of U.S. GDP price in ‡ation at time t: In other words, expected in ‡ation for the CE model is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past realized U.S. GDP price in ‡ation. The …gure also plots expected in ‡ation for a variable-gain version of the CE model, where the gain sequence is taken from the bottom panel of Figure 5 . 22 The …gure shows that the RE 2 0 The survey is available from http://www.phil.frb.org/…les/spf/cpie1.txt. It should be noted that modelbased values of expected in ‡ation are annualized 1-quarter rates, whereas the survey data are 1-year ahead average in ‡ation rates.
2 1 Recall that equation (8) implies a steady-state in ‡ation rate of zero. For comparison with the survey, the RE model-based values are shifted up by a constant to match the mean of U.S. in ‡ation over the sample period.
2 2 Both CE models employ the initial condition b Et 1 t = t 1; where t 1 is U.S. GDP price in ‡ation at 1968.Q4. model performs poorly in capturing observed movements in the survey-based measure of U.S. expected in ‡ation, whereas both versions of the CE model perform well. The performance of the RE model could of course be improved by introducing a persistent exogenous process for the Fed's actual in ‡ation target which would help capture the low frequency movements in the survey data.
[ Figure 6 about here]
In ‡ation Forecast Errors
This section characterizes the unconditional moments of in ‡ation forecast errors. When the actual law of motion for in ‡ation is given by (12), the errors associated with the subjective forecast rule (9) exhibit near-zero autocorrelation for most values of : Furthermore, an agent who is concerned about minimizing forecast errors can become "locked-in" to the use of the subjective forecast. In particular, for most values of ; the agent will perceive no accuracy gain from switching to a fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast. 23 Suppose that the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9). The initial choice could be justi…ed for reasons of computational or informational simplicity. The forecast error observed by the agent is given by
where I have made use of the actual law of motion (12). Now consider an agent who is contemplating a switch to a fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast. In deciding whether to switch forecasts, the agent keeps track of the forecast errors associated with each forecast method. Before any switch occurs, the actual law of motion for t is still governed by (12). For simplicity, assume that enough time has gone by to allow the agent to have discovered the stochastic process for the fundamental driving variable y t . Also assume that the agent has knowledge of the Phillips curve slope parameter and the real-time value of the driving variable. With these assumptions, a fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast can be represented by the right-side of equation (8). The associated forecast error is given by (22) where the superscript "f" denotes the error associated with the fundamentals-based forecast.
Forecast Lock-in
Given a su¢ ciently long time series of observations, the agent could compute the moments of the observed forecast errors under each of the above scenarios. Appendix B provides analytical expressions for the moments of the forecast errors. If the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9), then the associated …tness measure is given by M SE E h (err t+1 ) 2 i . Conditional on the same actual law of motion (12), the …tness measure for the fundamentals-based forecast is given by Figure 7 plots the moments of the in ‡ation forecast errors for 0 < 1: All parameters are set to the baseline values. For ease of comparison across panels, I plot the root mean squared error RM SE. Lower values imply a more accurate forecast. Vertical lines mark the value that is consistent with the perceived law of motion (10).
[ Figure 7 about here]
Panel 7a shows that the subjective forecast rule will become locked-in for 0 < < 0:98: In this range, the combination of in ‡ation persistence and volatility induced by the actual law of motion (12) cause the subjective forecast rule to be more accurate than the fundamentalsbased forecast. As ! 1, persistence declines and volatility rises (Figure 3) , which has the e¤ect of reducing the accuracy of the subjective forecast relative to the fundamentals-based forecast. Notice that the plot of RM SE for the subjective forecast is relatively ‡at in the vicinity of : This validates the conjecture put forth earlier in the discussion of Figure 2 ; forecast accuracy does not change much as long as remains in the general vicinity of .
The intuition for why lock-in occurs is straightforward. In computing the forecast …tness measures, the representative agent views the evolution of t as being determined outside of his control. In equilibrium, of course, the chosen forecast rule does in ‡uence the evolution of t : When the agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9), the resulting law of motion for t is such that the fundamentals-based forecast is no longer the most accurate. Similar to the lock-in phenomena described by David (1985) and Arthur (1989) , externalities that arise from an initial choice can lead to irreversibilities that may cause agents to stick with an inferior technology. Here, the subjective forecast rule (9) can be viewed as an inferior prediction technology because the mean squared forecast error could be lowered if the representative agent could be induced to switch to the fundamentals-based forecast.
Other Models of In ‡ation Expectations
Other models of in ‡ation expectations have been proposed to address the shortcomings of the fully-rational NKPC. Two commonly-used setups are "hybrid expectations" and "sticky information." Hybrid expectations can be represented as
where expected in ‡ation at time t is a weighted-average of a rational forward-looking component E t t+1 and a backward-looking component t 1 : This setup can be motivated by the presence of some rule-of-thumb agents (Roberts 1997, Galí and Gertler 1999) , alternative wage contracts (Buiter and Jewitt 1981, Fuhrer and Moore 1995) , or the use of backward-looking price indexation by …rms (Woodford 2003) . The exogenous weighting parameter ! is typically set to a value around 0:5. Sticky information can be represented as
where expected in ‡ation at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving average of current and past vintages of rational forecasts. The exogenous parameter can be interpreted as the fraction of agents in the economy who update to the current vintage forecast E t t+1 each period. The sticky-information version of the NKPC was originally derived by Mankiw and Reis (2002) . Using survey data on household and professional in ‡ation forecasts, Carroll (2003) estimates = 0:27: Table 3 compares theoretical moments for t and t across the various expectation models. 24 In each case, y t is governed by equation (2). As noted earlier, the rational expectations (RE) model exhibits low in ‡ation persistence, but it does predict a strong negative autocorrelation for the change in in ‡ation-a robust feature of U.S. data. The hybrid expectations (HE) model is successful in generating more in ‡ation persistence, as indicated by the result Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = 0:87: Counterfactually, however, the HE model predicts a weak negative autocorrelation for the change in in ‡ation, with Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = 0:07. This de…ciency in the HE model has been pointed out by Cecchetti et al. (2007) . The sticky information (SI) model exhibits an intermediate level of in ‡ation persistence, while maintaining the strong negative autocorrelation for the change in in ‡ation. The consistent expectations (CE) model generates high in ‡ation persistence and a strong negative autocorrelation for the change in in ‡ation. At the baseline parameterization, in ‡ation volatility is highest for the HE and CE models. Numerous authors have demonstrated that U.S. in ‡ation exhibits a gradual, hump-shaped response to unanticipated demand shocks. Although not plotted, the SI and the CE models exhibit very similar hump-shaped responses when subjected to a 1-standard deviation shock to u t in equation (2). A shift in u t can be interpreted as a surprise change in monetary policy that causes an unexpected shift in aggregate demand. 25 The SI and CE models share a common trait. In both models, expected in ‡ation (and hence in ‡ation itself) is governed by a moving average algorithm which delivers a hump-shaped response.
A natural extension of the CE model (discussed in the next section) allows the Kalman gain to vary over time, giving rise to time-varying persistence and volatility. The HE and SI models do not lend themselves to such an extension. Since ! and represent fractions of agents of a particular type in the economy, these parameters would be expected to remain fairly stable.
Model Simulations
Figure 8 plots simulated data for three di¤erent forms of in ‡ation expectations. The left-side panels show the results for rational expectations. The middle panels show the results for consistent expectations, where the gain parameter is held constant at the theoretical equilibrium value = 0:346 implied by De…nition 1. The right-side panels show the results for an alternative "variable-gain" version of the CE model that is described in Appendix A.
In the variable-gain model, the signal-to-noise ratio is inferred from the autocorrelation of t over a 20-year (80-quarter) rolling sample period, analogous to the procedure used to construct Figure 5 . The use of a rolling sample period allows for slowly-evolving perceptions of the signal-to-noise ratio, where perceptions are based on each generation's in ‡ation experience. Alternatively, we may think of the representative agent as an econometrician who views 20-year-old in ‡ation data as being uninformative about the current value of . Friedman (1979, p. 33) argues that most empirical time series analysis in economics is based on "some rough form of rolling sample period." 26 In the variable-gain model, the actual law of motion for in ‡ation is nonlinear and thus capable of generating time-varying persistence and volatility. Recall that the model abstracts from any changes in the actual in ‡ation trend; only the perceived trend is shifting. To achieve a meaningful comparison with U.S. data (which may be in ‡uenced by historical changes in the Fed's in ‡ation target), I use a band pass …lter to detrend both the model-generated data and the U.S. data.
[ Figure 8 about here]
Comparing across panels 8a, 8b, and 8c, we see that the same sequence of random shocks can lead to vastly di¤erent in ‡ation dynamics, depending on the form of in ‡ation expectations. The RE model's detrended in ‡ation data exhibits very mild variation in persistence (panel 8d) and essentially no variation in volatility (panel 8g). Detrended in ‡ation from the constant-gain CE model exhibits a fair amount of variation in persistence (panel 8e), but very little variation in volatility (panel 8h). Detrended in ‡ation from the variable-gain CE model exhibits large variations in both persistence (panel 8f) and volatility (panel 8i).
Given that the variable-gain model is nonlinear, the rolling measures of persistence and volatility can exhibit intervals of rapid variation followed by intervals of relative stability. This behavior can be seen clearly in panels 8f and 8i. Experiments with the model show that the agent's use of a shorter rolling sample period to infer the signal-to-noise ratio contributes to more rapid variation in persistence and volatility, but the rolling summary statistics can still exhibit irregular intervals of rapid variation interspersed with intervals of relative stability. Tables 4, 5, and 6 include results for the variable-gain model when the agent employs a shorter (40-quarter) rolling sample period to infer :
In contrast to the RE model, both versions of the CE model produce low-frequency swings in the level of in ‡ation, as measured by either the band pass …lter trends (panels 8b and 8c) or the 20-year rolling sample means (panels 8k and 81). The low-frequency swings are not caused by changes in monetary policy. Instead, these movements derive solely from the nearrandom walk behavior of in ‡ation under consistent expectations. To see this, note that the constant-gain CE version of the NKPC can be written as:
2 t 2 + :::
which implies that the sum of the weights on lagged in ‡ation is (1 ) = (1 ) = 0:970 when = 0:98 and = 0:346: Given the highly persistent nature of t observed in equilibrium, it would be very di¢ cult for the agent to the reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in in ‡ation, thus lending support for the perceived law of motion (10).
Figure 9 provides some additional justi…cation for the variable-gain model. Panel 9a plots the signal-to-noise ratios inferred from the rolling autocorrelation of t for both a constantgain and a variable-gain simulation. The inferred value of from the constant-gain simulation exhibits a fair amount of variation. Like Stock and Watson (2007) , the agent may be inclined to view the shock variances 2 and 2 v in equation (10) as stochastic variables. From the agent's perspective, the presence of stochastic volatility would justify a switch to a variable-gain forecasting algorithm. Once the switch occurs, the volatility of the perceived signal-to-noise ratio becomes magni…ed. The perception of stochastic volatility is thus self-con…rming.
At times during the variable-gain simulation, the rolling sample autocorrelation of t may yield the result that t < 0; which is infeasible for a ratio of two variances. When this occurs, t is set equal to t 1 ; i.e., the agent sticks with the previous estimate of the signalto-noise ratio if the most recent estimate is not economically reasonable. 27 Similar results are obtained if the agent sets t = 0 whenever the sample autocorrelation statistic yields the result t < 0: Panel 9a shows that the sample autocorrelation statistic can imply t < 0 for sustained intervals during the simulation. Low values of the signal-to-noise ratio imply a low value of the Kalman gain parameter which, in turn, serves to reduce in ‡ation persistence and volatility as shown earlier in Figure 3 . Consequently, a regime of low signal-to-noise ratios tends to be self-perpetuating.
[ Figure 9 about here] Panel 9b plots the time-path of the variable Kalman gain for one simulation. The average value of the gain over 200 simulations (each 2000 quarters in length) is 0.430. As noted earlier in reference to the real-time learning algorithm, the shape of the map T ( ) implies that a small amount of sampling variation in the autocorrelation of t can translate into sizable shifts in the Kalman gain. The gain rises sharply in response to upward spikes in the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. These recurring episodes might interpreted as "credibility crises"or "in ‡ation scares,"which cause the agent to heavily discount the central bank's past track record on in ‡ation. De ‡ation scares are also possible. Lastly, panel 9c shows that when in ‡ation is actually generated using the variable-gain forecast, the agent perceives no accuracy gain from switching to the fundamentals-based in ‡ation forecast. The RMSE for each forecast is computed over a 20-year rolling sample period. Table 4 provides a quantitative comparison of the forecast errors across the three forms of in ‡ation expectations. The RE model delivers the most-accurate forecasts (as indicated by the lowest RM SE value), whereas the variable-gain model delivers the least-accurate forecasts. However, as shown earlier, if the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9), then the agent is unlikely to perceive any accuracy gain from switching to the fundamentals-based forecast. In the constant-gain model, the forecast errors are close to white noise. In the variable-gain model, the forecasts errors exhibit some weak negative autocorrelation, but it would take a large amount of data for the agent to reject the null hypothesis of white noise errors, especially given the sampling variation in the autocorrelation statistic. The explanation for the weak autocorrelation of forecast errors in the variable-gain model can be traced back to Figure 7 , which shows that the autocorrelation statistic is very ‡at for most values of : Table 5 compares the moments of U.S. data with the corresponding moments from model simulations. Statistics are presented for both raw and detrended data. Again, I focus on the behavior of the detrended data. The persistence of detrended in ‡ation is highest for the variable-gain model which yields a …rst-order autocorrelation of around 0:4; thus providing the best match with detrended U.S. in ‡ation data. The standard deviation of detrended in ‡ation in the variable-gain model is 0.032 when T s = 80 and 0.045 when T s = 40: These are the largest values among the di¤erent models. The corresponding …gure for long-run U.S. CPI in ‡ation is 0.073, whereas the …gure for post-World War II GDP price in ‡ation is 0.016. To provide a better sense of the invariant distributions generated by the di¤erent expectation models, Table 6 reports the average amplitude of variation of selected 20-year rolling summary statistics. The statistics for persistence and volatility are based on detrended data, whereas the statistics for the mean are based on raw data (since the mean of detrended data is zero by construction). The U.S. data exhibits large swings in the rolling summary statistics, as shown earlier in Figure 1 . On average, the variable-gain model exhibits the largest swings in the rolling summary statistics. When the agent uses a shorter sample period (T s = 40) to infer from past data, the amplitude of variation in the rolling summary statistics becomes somewhat larger.
An informal visual comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 8 shows that the variablegain model can generate time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that observed in long-run U.S. data. The performance of the RE model on this front could of course be improved by introducing a heteroskedastic process for the driving variable y t ; or by introducing a persistent exogenous process for the central bank's actual in ‡ation target. The results presented here suggest that complicated exogenous driving processes may not be needed to account for many features of U.S. in ‡ation dynamics, if one is willing to entertain the idea of bounded rationality.
Was the Great In ‡ation Caused by Bad Luck?
An enormous literature has explored explanations for the "Great In ‡ation" of the 1970s and the subsequent "Volcker disin ‡ation" of the early 1980s. Theories about the rise and fall of U.S. in ‡ation fall roughly into one of three categories: (i) bad luck theories, (ii) policy mistake theories, and (iii) combination theories (where chance and policy discretion both play a role). One bad-luck theory is that U.S. in ‡ation is governed by a unit-root process or something close to a unit root. This means that a sequence of white-noise shocks can generate large excursions in the in ‡ation rate without any fundamental change in the underlying economy. According to this theory, there is nothing special about the 1970s and 1980s and similar events can happen again, given enough time. King and Watson (1994) present evidence that post-war U.S. in ‡ation is indeed governed by a unit-root process.
The variable-gain CE model produces some episodes where the 20-year rolling measures of persistence, volatility, and mean of raw in ‡ation all trace out hump-shaped patterns. 28 The patterns are somewhat similar to those in post-World War II U.S. data. The simulation results suggest that white-noise fundamental shocks, propagated via the expectations feedback mechanism, could have played a role in producing the historical pattern of U.S. in ‡ation. Along these lines, Blinder (1982) argues that oil and food price shocks, coupled with pent-up in ‡ation from the release of the Nixon wage-price controls in 1974, can account for most of the rise in in ‡ation during the 1970s. He also argues that the absence of these same factors can account for most of the fall in in ‡ation during the early 1980s. More recently, Sims and Zha (2006) argue that the primary source of the rise and fall of U.S. in ‡ation was a "changing array of major disturbances" that occurred during a relatively stable monetary policy regime.
Detailed historical studies by Hetzel (1998 ), Mayer (1999 ), and Nelson (2005 all emphasize the idea that monetary policymakers of the 1970s believed that much of the observed in ‡ation was being driven by factors outside of the Fed's control. At the peak of the Great In ‡ation, Fed Chairman Volcker (1979, pp. 888-889) acknowledged the importance of in ‡ation expectations as an independent driving force for realized in ‡ation. He said: "In ‡ation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of in ‡ationary expectations."
Notwithstanding the above discussion, changes in monetary policy do appear to have played a role in shaping the pattern of U.S. in ‡ation-with the Volcker disin ‡ation serving as the prime example. Research discussing this episode typically emphasizes the role of central bank credibility, noting that the rate at which credibility accumulates depends on the nature of in ‡ation expectations. 29 This idea connects well with the interpretation of the perceived signal-to-noise ratio as an inverse measure of central bank credibility.
A comprehensive study of the Great In ‡ation and the subsequent "Great Moderation"period of reduced macroeconomic volatility would require a fully-articulated model that includes both a micro-founded IS equation and a speci…cation for shifts in monetary policy. The results presented here suggest that boundedly-rational in ‡ation expectations may be a useful element of such a study.
Concluding Remarks
Evolving theories about in ‡ation expectations, led by the contributions of Phelps (1967) , Friedman (1968) , Sargent (1971) , and Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 have played an important role in shaping the modern view of the Phillips curve. The current workhorse version for macroeconomics is the New Keynesian Phillips curve with rational expectations. The advantages of the NKPC are its tractability and its link to microfoundations that assume optimizing behavior on the part of agents and …rms. The biggest disadvantage of the NKPC is its inability to account endogenously for some important quantitative features of U.S. in ‡ation dynamics.
Rational expectations are sometimes called "model consistent expectations." A more precise term would be "actual-model consistent expectations,"because the maintained assumption is that the agent knows the actual model. In contrast, the concept explored in this paper could be described as "perceived-model consistent expectations," because the agent's forecast rule is optimized for a perceived law of motion for in ‡ation, given the observed moments of the in ‡ation time series.
In the boundedly-rational NKPC examined here, expected in ‡ation is an exponentiallyweighted moving average of past observed in ‡ation rates. The observed autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes is used to pin down the value of the Kalman gain parameter that governs the weights assigned to past rates of in ‡ation in the agent's forecast rule. This result harkens back to the "accelerationist controversy" identi…ed by Sargent (1971, p. 35 ) who argued persuasively that any forecast weighting scheme involving past rates of in ‡ation should "be compatible with the observed evolution of the rate of in ‡ation."
In the variable Kalman gain version of the model, endogenous shifts in the agent's perceived signal-to-noise ratio (which might be viewed as an inverse-measure of central bank credibility) give rise to changes in in ‡ation persistence and volatility. These changes can take place in the absence of any underlying shifts in monetary policy. This feature of the model o¤ers a possible explanation for the end-of-sample changes in U.S. in ‡ation dynamics shown in Figure  1 , which have occurred during a period of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy.
A Appendix: Real-Time Learning and Variable-Gain Model
Real-time learning is discussed in Section 4 of the text. The learning algorithm is described by the following system of nonlinear equations t = b E t t+1 + y t + " t; (A.1) where y t is governed by equation (2). Equations (A.1) and (A.2) de…ne the actual law of motion for in ‡ation when the Kalman gain is evolving over time. Equations (A.3) through (A.5) are used to recursively estimate the autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes using all past data. 30 Equation (A.6) is the full-sample estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio. Equation (A.7) is the out-of-steady state version of the Kalman gain formula (11). 31 To obtain the "variable-gain" version of the model that is discussed in Section 8 of the text, equations (A.3) through (A.5) are modi…ed to compute the autocorrelation of in ‡ation changes over a 20-year rolling sample period rather than over the full sample period. Both the real-time learning algorithm and the variable-gain model employ a "projection facility,"which sets t = t 1 whenever the sample autocorrelation of t yields the result that t < 0:
B Appendix: Moments of In ‡ation Forecast Errors
This appendix provides analytical expressions for the moments used in plotting Figure 7 . Consider the case when the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9). In equilibrium, the actual law of motion is given by equation (12). Both the subjective forecast and the fundamentals-based forecast are unbiased, i.e., E (err t+1 ) = E err f t+1 = 0: Starting from (21), the …tness measure for the subject forecast is given by M SE = which bears a striking resemblance to the autocorrelation of in ‡ation under rational expectations, as given by (6) A comparison of (6) and (B.3) reveals that parameter con…gurations which give rise to low autocorrelation of in ‡ation under rational expectations will imply an even lower autocorrelation of forecast errors under the subjective forecast rule (9). Next, we start from (22). The …tness measure for the fundamentals-based forecast is given by This appendix outlines the model solutions discussed in Section 7 of the text.
C.1 Hybrid Expectations
Substituting equation (23) into the NKPC (1) and then solving for the equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients yields 
C.2 Sticky Information
Equation (24) can be written in recursive form as b E si t t+1 = E t t+1 + (1 ) b E si t 1 t : Substituting the recursive form into the NKPC (1) and then solving for the equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients yields the following system of equations 
